# THE CHINESE SILVER STANDARD: PARITY, PREDICTABILITY, AND (IN)STABILITY, 1912–1934

## HUACHEN LI<sup>†</sup> AND JAMES M. NASON<sup>‡</sup>

April 27, 2024

This paper assesses the debate about the demise of the Chinese silver standard in the mid
1930s. One side argues the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of June 1934 drained China of silver, which
caused deflation and economic crises. A related claim is the Chinese silver standard was in-
tringically unetable. These hypotheses are evaluated by actimating Payorian etwictural VADs

trinsically unstable. These hypotheses are evaluated by estimating Bayesian structural VARs with drifting parameters on China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples from April 1912 to September 1934. We find instability in the Chinese silver standard peaked during the recession of the early 1920s and the Great Depression. Hence, neither the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of June 1934 nor a design flaw led to the end of the Chinese silver standard.

*JEL Classification Number*: E42, F31, F33, and N25.

Abstract \_

*Keywords*: China; silver standard; exchange rate; parity deviation; Bayesian structural VAR.

†*e-mail*: li8@kenyon.edu, *website*: https://sites.google.com/view/huachenli, *affiliation*: Department of Economics, Kenyon College.

‡*e-mail*: jmnason87@gmail.com, *website*: https://www.jamesmnason.net, *affiliations*: Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Australian National University and Virginia Center for Economic Policy, University of Virginia.

Acknowledgments: We thank Gary Richardson, Liuyan Zhao, and especially Gregor Smith for comments that improved this paper and also comments from participants in a session of the November 2023 Midwest Macro Group meetings at Texas Tech University and a seminar at the School of Economics, Peking University. The online appendix for the paper is available at https://www.jamesmnason.net/research. All errors are our own.

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

The Chinese economy ran on a commodity monetary standard linked to silver for hundreds of years before its end in the mid 1930s. By 1900, payments for regional trade within China were settled in local money markets each using its own unit of account denominated in *tael* (*liang* or Chinese ounce). Embedded in a local *tael* was a price for silver, but China took the world price of silver as given. As a result, it defined parity for the Chinese silver standard.

The Nanjing government replaced the Chinese silver standard with the *fabi* (fiat currency) in November 1935 (1935м11).<sup>1</sup> However, Leavens (1939, pp. 300–302) describes the Nanjing government as breaking the Chinese silver standard a year earlier. A customs duty on exports of silver was levied by the Nanjing government to reduce these flows in 1934м10. At the same time, it imposed an equalization charge (step-up duty) on silver exports and began a regime of managed exchange rates. The intent of the last two actions was to restore the Chinese silver standard to parity by moving the domestic price of silver closer to the world price. These policy tools were needed because beginning in 1934м10 the customs duty on exports of silver decoupled the Chinese silver standard from the world price of silver.

There are theories to explain the Nanjing government's motives for ending the Chinese silver standard. Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Chang (1988), Friedman (1992), Burdekin (2008), Silber (2019), and Dean (2020) posit the Chinese silver standard was damaged by the U.S. Silver Purchase Act passed by Congress in 1934M06. The Act instructed the Treasury to buy silver at a price greater than in the spot market. Accordingly, silver left China causing deflation, financial crises, and the Nanjing government's policy responses starting in 1934M10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The Nanjing government substituted the *yuan* (Chinese silver dollar) for the *tael* in 1933m04. This was only a change in numeraire. As Bratter (1933) notes, the rate to change *yuan* into *tael* was fixed. Banks still paid silver for their notes and deposits on demand. When the *fabi* became legal tender in China, convertibility ceased.

Shiroyama (2008), Ho and Lai (2013), and Ho (2014) offer a related hypothesis that instability was built into the Chinese silver standard. They argue its fragility was accentuated by the U.S. Silver Purchase Act because parity for the Chinese silver standard was defined by the world price of silver. Hence, domestic fiscal and monetary policy could not smooth shocks that produced deviations from parity of the Chinese silver standard.

This paper frames its evaluation of the two theories with the exchange rate-risk premium model of Engel (2016). He divided the log of the exchange rate,  $e_t$ , into trend and transitory components. The latter is the negative of the expected future paths of the cross-country interest rate spread,  $i_t$ , and deviations from parity,  $\rho_t$ , which is the risk premium. Starting from this decomposition, we construct a regression that runs  $\Delta e_t$  on its own lags,  $i_t$ , the cross-country inflation gap,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and their lags. The regression uses the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition to impose a random walk on the trend of  $e_t$ , differences  $e_t$ , its trend, and transitory component, applies a result in Nason and Rogers (2008), and assumes  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and currency returns,  $\Delta e_t$ , are generated by a reduced-form VAR.

We identify several structural VARs that are grounded in this regression. Our baseline SVAR consists of it and regressions of  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ , and  $\rho_t$  that place zeros on their nine off-diagonal impact coefficients. These restrictions globally identify international finance, cross-country nominal demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks. We also globally identify these shocks in 10 alternative SVARs that depart from the baseline by allowing different combinations of the off-diagonal impact coefficients in the  $\pi_t$  and  $\rho_t$  regressions to be free parameters.

Assessing the merits of the two hypotheses is an empirical exercise. With this in mind, we compile China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples from 1912 M 04 to 1934 M 09. The Chinese silver standard has not been studied before using these monthly samples. The samples consist of  $i_t$ ,

 $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and  $\Delta e_t$ , given China is the home country and the U.K. or U.S. is the foreign economy.

There is research disputing the two hypotheses of the end of the Chinese silver standard. Rawski (1993) shows China had inflation after passage of the Silver Purchase Act in 1934M06. Ho, Lai, and Gau (2013) find the U.S. dollar-tael exchange rate moved with the world price of silver on a pre-1934M10 sample. Chen, Li, and Xie (2022) report evidence on pre-1935 annual data that the lack of deflation stemmed from Chinese banks issuing notes backed by silver that replaced the missing commodity money. Finally, Brandt and Sargent (1989) focus on two goals they argue animated the Nanjing government's actions from 1934M10 to creating the fabi in 1935M11. The Nanjing government coveted the income generated in domestic and international money markets in China and sought to undo the constraints the Chinese silver standard imposed on domestic fiscal and monetary policy. The upshot is that neither the U.S. Silver Purchase Act nor its inherent fragility led the Chinese silver standard to fail.

The empirical literature studying the Chinese silver standard often uses time series econometric methods. Leading examples are Lai and Gau (2003), Burdekin (2008), Ho and Lai (2013, 2016), Ho, Lai, and Gau (2013), Ho (2014), Jacks, Yan, and Zhao (2017), Zhao and Zhao (2018), Ma and Zhao (2020), Palma and Zhao (2021), and Chen, Li, and Xie (2022). Our paper extends this literature in three ways. As already mentioned, we identify SVARs starting from the exchange rate-risk premium model of Engel (2016) and amass new China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples from 1912m04 to 1934m09. Third, the SVARs are estimated with time-varying parameters (TVPs) and stochastic volatility (SV).

The TVPs and SVs are included in the SVARs to handle the turmoil affecting China, the U.K., and U.S. from 1912 to 1935. China suffered political upheaval during these years. Important episodes were the Warlord Era, which began in 1916m06 and ended with the Northern

Expedition of 1926M07–1928M12 that unified China under the Nanjing government, the Civil War starting in 1927M08, and the invasion of Manchuria by Japan in 1931M09. For the U.K. and U.S, the First World War, its aftermath, and the Great Depression defined the era. These events drove changes in the underlying economic environment that are reflected in TVPs and SV.

We draft the Metropolis in Gibbs Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampler of Canova and Pérez Forero (2015) to estimate the TVP-SV-SVARs. Their MCMC sampler is capable of generating posterior distributions of a TVP-SV-SVAR having non-recursive restrictions, which describes several of the alternative identifications. The posterior distributions yield TVPs, SVs, and additional moments to assess the sources and causes of the failure of the Chinese silver standard. The additional moments are month by month tests of uncovered interest parity (UIP), predictability and instability statistics of Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) and Cogley and Sargent (2015), and impulse response functions (IRFs).

The estimated TVP-SV-SVARs yield little evidence the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934m06 or intrinsic instability caused the Chinese silver standard to collapse. There are few rejections of UIP, SV and instability peak in 1920 and 1921 and the Great Depression, predictability starts to rise in the Great Depression if not earlier, and the IRFs are nearly unchanged from 1934m01 to 1934m09. This leaves the actions the Nanjing government took beginning in 1934m10 as the remaining explanation for the breakdown of the Chinese silver standard.

The outline of the paper follows. Section 2 discusses the Chinese silver standard and data. The SVARs are constructed in section 3. Section 4 describes the TVP-SV-SVARs and Bayesian estimation methods. Results appear in sections 5 and 6. Section 7 concludes.

#### 2. THE CHINESE SILVER STANDARD AND ITS DATA

This section reviews the Chinese silver standard and the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples.

#### 2.a. The Chinese silver standard

The only role a *tael* had in the Chinese silver standard was as a unit of account. Mediums of exchange in retail trade were copper, brass, and silver coins that had fractional claims on a *tael*; see Leavens (1939, pp. 87). Commercial and financial transactions were settled in local *tael* of which more than 170 existed by the early 1900s; see Dean (2020).

Of the unit of accounts that existed under the Chinese silver standard, Young (1931), Bratter (1933), Leavens (1939), Brandt, Ma, and Rawski (2014), Jacks, Yan, and Zhao (2017), and Ma (2019) contend the Shanghai *tael*, which dated to 1857, was preeminent by the 1910s. At the time the Republic of China was declared and Qing dynasty collapsed in early 1912, the bulk of China's international trade already flowed through the port of Shanghai. This helped Shanghai to become the hub of the most dynamic economy in China. As a result, the Shanghai *tael* came to dominate domestic and international economic and financial activity in China.

Domestic and international economic activity were supported by banks in Shanghai. They backed their notes and cleared domestic accounts with reserves held in silver ingots of about 50 Shanghai *taels* that were known as shoes of *sycee* (*i.e.*, fine silk); see Leavens (1939, p. 92).<sup>2</sup> Shanghai banks also exported shoes of *sycee* and imported silver denominated in Shanghai *tael* to settle international claims. Nevertheless, settling payments often prompted Shanghai banks, given the state of their balance sheets, to trade reserves in an interbank market operated by the *Shanghai Qian Ye Gong Hui* (*i.e.*, Shanghai Banking Association).<sup>3</sup> Since the Shanghai interbank rate,  $i_{S,t}$ , cleared this market, it linked  $i_{S,t}$  with foreign currency-Shanghai *tael* exchange rates.

The Chinese silver standard operating mechanism differed from the gold standard. One

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Converting a *tael* into a domestic price of silver was possible because, as Leavens (1939, pp. 91–95) discusses, weight and fineness (*i.e.*, grains of silver and fractional content of silver) defined a *tael*. In addition, Leavens notes the long time custom of the "Shanghai convention" converting the ideal *tael* into the Shanghai *tael*.

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ The Nanjing government nationalized the large Shanghai banks in 1935M04, which ended their interbank market.

reason was the world price of silver was set in a spot market in London or New York City (NYC).<sup>4</sup> Another was British pound (*GBP*)- and U.S. dollar (*USD*)-Shanghai *tael* exchange rates floated from 1912M04 to 1934M09.<sup>5</sup> Since the world price of silver defined parity for the Chinese silver standard, deviations from parity were observable,  $\rho_t = e_{j/S,t} - SP_t$ , where  $e_{j/S,t}$  and  $SP_t$  denote logs of the *GBP*- or *USD*-Shanghai *tael* exchange rate and world price of silver. Hence,  $\rho_t \ge 0$  represented overvaluation, parity, or undervaluation of the Shanghai *tael*.<sup>6</sup> This equilibrium relationship also restricted the dynamic mechanism that restored the Chinese silver standard to parity.<sup>7</sup> Since a deviation from parity of the Chinese silver standard was its risk premium, the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934M06 was a one-off risk premium shock internal to the China-U.S. sample, but was external to the China-U.K. sample.

## 2.b. The China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples: 1912M04-1934M09

The founding of the Republic of China in 1912M01 and fall of the Qing dynasty the next month motivate us to begin the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples in 1912M04. The samples end in 1934M09. The following month, the Nanjing government severed the link between  $e_t$  and  $SP_t$ ; see Leavens (1939, pp. 300–302) and Ho, Lai, and Gau (2013).

Figure 1 plots the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples,  $y_t = [i_t \ \pi_t \ \rho_t \ \Delta e_t]'$ , from 1912M04 to 1934M09, T = 270. From left to right and top to bottom, the panels contain plots of  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and  $\Delta e_t$ . China-U.K. variables are dot-dashed (red) lines, dotted (blue) lines are China-U.S. variables, Burns and Mitchell (1946) recession dates for the U.K. are vertical tan bars, and NBER

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The world silver market was in New York City from 1915м01 to 1934м08. London housed the world silver market from 1912м04 to 1914м12 and in 1934м09.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>The U.K. and U.S. operated under different monetary systems (*i.e.*, the gold standard) than China on our sample. <sup>6</sup>Leavens (1939, p. 102) estimates that just the cost of shipping silver between Shanghai and NYC drove  $e_{USD/S,t}$  to vary on average by  $\pm 2.5\%$  around  $SP_t$ . Shipping costs between Shanghai and London raised this to  $\pm 5.0\%$  for the  $e_{GBP/S,t}$  after 1920, but Leavens argues it was triple this during the First World War. Jacks, Yan, and Zhao (2017) present econometric evidence that confirm Leaven's estimates.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>This differs from the modern floating exchange rate regime in which the real exchange rate serves this purpose as, for example, in the vector error correction model estimated by Engel (2016).

recession dates for the U.S. are vertical silver bars. Appendix A1 reviews the ways we compile the data and business cycle dates in figure 1, but summaries of  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and  $\Delta e_t$  follow.

**INTEREST RATE SPREAD,**  $i_t$ : Cross-country interest rate spreads are  $i_t = i_{S,t} - i_{j,t}$ , j = UK, US. Zhongguo ren min yin hang Shanghai Shi fen hang (1960) has monthly observations for the Shanghai interbank rate,  $i_{S,t}$ .<sup>8</sup> Monthly money market rates for the U.K.,  $i_{UK,t}$ , and U.S.,  $i_{US,t}$ , are found in the NBER Macrohistory database.

**INFLATION DIFFERENTIAL,**  $\pi_t$ : Shanghai, U.K., and U.S. wholesale price indexes (WPIs) define inflation,  $\pi_{m,t} = 100 \left( p_{m,t} - p_{m,t-1} \right)$ , where  $p_{m,t} = \ln WPI_{m,t}$  and m = S, UK, US. The Shanghai Research Institute of Economics (1958) supplies monthly  $WPI_{S,t}$  starting in 1922. Before 1922, Kong (1988) has an annual WPI for China. We compile a new  $WPI_{S,t}$  from 1912M04 to 1934M09 by placing these WPIs on the same 1921 base year, interpolating the former into months, and splicing together these monthly WPIs at 1921M12–1922M01. The NBER Macrohistory database has monthly  $WPI_{UK,t}$  and  $WPI_{US,t}$ . The WPIs yield  $\pi_t = \pi_{S,t} - \pi_{j,t}$  for j = UK, US.

**DEVIATIONS FROM PARITY,**  $\rho_t$ : Deviations from parity of the Chinese silver standard are calculated as  $\rho_t = 100 \left( e_{j/S,t} - SP_t \right)$ , j = GBP, USD. Wu (1935) has observations on  $\rho_t$  from 1912M04 to 1933M12. Ho and Lai (2016) are tapped for the last nine data points of the samples.

**NOMINAL CURRENCY RETURNS,**  $\Delta e_t$ : We obtain  $e_{GBP/S,t}$  and  $e_{USD/S,t}$  from Kong (1988). First differencing  $e_{j/S,t}$  yields the currency return,  $\Delta e_{j/S,t} = 100 \left( e_{j/S,t} - e_{j/S,t-1} \right)$ , j = GBP, USD.

# 3. AN EXCHANGE RATE-RISK PREMIUM SVAR

This section presents the exchange rate-risk premium model of Engel (2016), our baseline SVAR, and broadens it to 10 alternatives.

 $<sup>^8</sup>$ Ho and Li (2014) use  $i_{S,t}$  to study instability in the Shanghai government bond market of the 1920s and 1930s.

3.a. An exchange rate model with deviations from Chinese silver standard parity

The exchange rate-risk premium model of Engel (2016) is grounded in a concept of excess currency returns linking deviations from parity for the Chinese silver standard to a risk premium denominated in *tael* earned for holding deposits in *GBP* or *USD*. The risk premium appears in a first-order approximation of currency returns,  $\Delta e_{t+1} = i_t + \rho_{t+1}$ . The related law of motion of the exchange rate is  $e_t = \mathbf{E}_t e_{t+1} - \left(i_t + \mathbf{E}_t \rho_{t+1}\right)$ , where  $\mathbf{E}_t \rho_{t+1} \neq 0$  violates UIP and  $\mathbf{E}_t \{\cdot\}$  is the mathematical expectations operator conditional on date t information. Push the law of motion ahead a period, pass  $\mathbf{E}_t \{\cdot\}$  through, replace  $\mathbf{E}_t e_{t+1}$ , and repeat  $\mathcal I$  times to find

$$e_{t} = \mathbf{E}_{t} e_{t+J+1} - \sum_{j=0}^{J} \mathbf{E}_{t} \left\{ i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+j+1} \right\}.$$
 (1)

Equation (1) shows exchange rate fluctuations are driven by its expectation  $\mathcal{J}+1$ -periods ahead net of the sum of  $\mathcal{J}+1$  expected returns that are excess,  $\mathbf{E}_t \rho_{t+j}$ , and otherwise,  $\mathbf{E}_t i_{t+j}$ .

# 3.b. Permanent and transitory components of the nominal exchange rate

Engel (2016) decomposes  $e_t$  into trend and transitory elements,  $\tau_{e,t}$  and  $\varepsilon_{e,t}$ , using the Beveridge and Nelson (1981) decomposition and equation (1). The Beveridge-Nelson (BN) decomposition requires  $\tau_{e,t}$  to be a random walk with drift,  $\tau_{e,t} = \tau_e^* + \tau_{e,t-1} + \gamma_{e,\eta}\eta_{e,t}$ , where  $\tau_e^*$  is the deterministic growth rate of  $e_t$  and  $\eta_{e,t} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ . Taking  $\mathcal{I} \to \infty$  in equation (1) yields

$$e_t = \tau_{e,t} - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{E}_t \{ i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+1+j} \},$$
 (2)

where the BN trend is  $\tau_{e,t} = \lim_{\mathcal{J} \to \infty} \mathbf{E}_t \left\{ e_{t+\mathcal{J}+1} - \mathcal{J} \tau_e^* \right\}$ . Equation (2) decomposes  $e_t$  into  $\tau_{e,t}$  and its transitory component,  $\varepsilon_{e,t} = -\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{E}_t \left\{ i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+1+j} \right\}$ , that restricts  $i_t$  and  $\rho_t \sim I(0)$ . We difference equation (2),  $\Delta e_t = \gamma_{e,\eta} \eta_{e,t} - \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{E}_t \left\{ i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+j+1} \right\} + \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \mathbf{E}_{t-1} \left\{ i_{t+j-1} + \rho_{t+j} \right\}$ . Following Nason and Rogers (2008), add and subtract  $\mathbf{E}_{t-1} \left\{ i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+j+1} \right\}$  inside the brackets

of the second infinite sum of the previous expression to obtain

$$\Delta e_t = -(i_{t-1} + \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\rho_t) + \left[\mathbf{E}_t - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \varepsilon_{e,t} + \gamma_{e,\eta} \eta_{e,t}, \tag{3}$$

where  $\left[\mathbf{E}_{t} - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{e,t} = -\sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \left[\mathbf{E}_{t} - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \left\{i_{t+j} + \rho_{t+1+j}\right\}$ . Equation (3) links excess currency returns to  $\mathbf{E}_{t-1}\rho_{t} \neq 0$ , the forecast innovation of  $\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{e,t}$ ,  $\left[\mathbf{E}_{t} - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{e,t}$ , and the innovation of  $\boldsymbol{\tau}_{e,t}$ ,  $\eta_{e,t}$ . Hence, moving from the trend-cycle exchange rate decomposition (2) to equation (3) ties  $\Delta e_{t}$  to observables, forecasts of observables, and a forecast error.

## 3.c A structural currency return generating regression

We eliminate  $\mathbf{E}_{t-1}\rho_t$  and  $\left[\mathbf{E}_t - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{e,t}$  from equation (3) by assuming the joint probability distribution of  $y_t$  is a reduced-form VAR,  $y_t = \sum_{\ell=1}^k \mathbf{B}_\ell y_{t-\ell} + \lambda_t$ , where intercepts are ignored,  $\mathbf{B}_\ell$  is a  $n \times n$  matrix of lag coefficients, n=4, and  $\lambda_t \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\mathbf{0}_{n \times 1}, \mathbf{\Omega}_{\lambda}\right)$ . A singularity is ruled out in the VAR(k) by assuming  $p_t$  and the real exchange rate,  $q_t \equiv e_t - p_t$ , are I(1) implying  $e_t$  and  $p_t$  do not cointegrate. Invertibility is imposed on the VAR(k) by assuming  $\left[\mathbf{I}_n - \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L})\right]^{-1}$  is square summable, where  $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L}) = \sum_{\ell=1}^k \mathbf{B}_\ell \mathbf{L}^\ell$ . Stack k lags of  $y_t$  in  $u_t = \left[y_t' \ y_{t-1}' \dots y_{t-k+1}'\right]'$  to find the companion form of the VAR(k),  $u_t = \mathbf{B}u_{t-1} + \lambda_t$ , where  $\mathbf{B}$  is the  $nk \times nk$  companion matrix,  $\lambda_t = \left[\lambda_t' \ \mathbf{0}_{1 \times n(n-1)}\right]'$  for k > 1, and  $\lambda_t = \lambda_t$  for k = 1. The VAR(1) produces the j-month ahead forecast  $\mathbf{E}_t u_{t+j} = \mathbf{B}^j u_t$  that yields  $\mathbf{E}_{t-1} \rho_t = s_\rho \mathbf{B}u_t$ ,  $\left(\mathbf{E}_t - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right) u_{t+j} = \mathbf{B}^j \lambda_t$ , and  $\left[\mathbf{E}_t - \mathbf{E}_{t-1}\right] \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{e,t} = \left[s_t + s_\rho \mathbf{B}\right] \left[\mathbf{I}_{n^2} - \mathbf{B}\right]^{-1} \lambda_t$  that substituted into equation (3) sets  $\Delta e_t = -\left(i_{t-1} + s_\rho \mathbf{B}u_t\right) + y_{e,\eta}\eta_{e,t} - \left[s_t + s_\rho \mathbf{B}\right] \left[\mathbf{I}_{n^2} - \mathbf{B}\right]^{-1} \lambda_t$ , where  $s_t(s_\rho)$  is a  $1 \times nk$  vector full of zeros except for a one in the first (third) position. Using the companion form of the VAR(k) to eliminate  $\lambda_t$  in the last formula produces the regression

$$\Delta e_t = a_{\Delta e,i} i_t + a_{\Delta e,\pi} \pi_t + a_{\Delta e,\rho} \rho_t + \sum_{\ell=1}^k b_\ell y_{t-\ell} + y_{e,\eta} \eta_{e,t}, \tag{4}$$

where the impact and lag coefficients,  $a_{\Delta e,i}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\rho}$ , and  $b_1,\ldots,b_k$ , are nonlinear in  $\mathcal{B}$ .

Regression (4) restricts  $\Delta e_t$ . It responds to  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ , and  $\rho_t$  at impact,  $b_1$ , ...,  $b_k$  drive persistence, and the innovation to  $\tau_{e,t}$ ,  $\eta_{e,t}$ , scaled by  $\gamma_{e,\eta}$  creates unsystematic variation in  $\Delta e_t$ .

## 3.d Identifying Exchange Rate-Risk Premium SVARs

The impact coefficients of regression (4) are short-run restrictions that help to identify the SVAR  $\mathbf{A} \mathcal{Y}_t = \mathbf{A} \sum_{\ell=1}^k \mathbf{B}_\ell \mathcal{Y}_{t-\ell} + \mathbf{\Gamma} \eta_t$ , where structural shocks have unit variances,  $\eta_t \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}_{n\times 1}, \mathbf{I}_n)$ , the mapping from the structural to reduced-forms shocks is  $\eta_t = \mathbf{\Gamma}^{-1} \mathbf{A} \lambda_t$ , and  $\mathbf{\Gamma}$  is a diagonal matrix containing scale volatilities. We combine  $a_{\Delta e,i}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho}$  with zeros imposed on the impact coefficients in the  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ , and  $\rho_t$  regressions to construct the impact matrix

$$\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{BL}} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\Delta e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \tag{5}$$

of our baseline SVAR, SVAR-BL. Appendix A2 shows the restrictions imposed on  $\mathbf{A}_{BL}$  in equation (5) satisfy the necessary and sufficiency conditions for global identification of Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010).

There are 510 possible As if one, two, or three of the nine impact coefficients in the  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ , and  $\rho_t$  regressions are non-zero. We avoid analyzing all 510 by admitting into the model space only globally identified SVARs that order  $i_t$  first followed by  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and  $\Delta e_t$  and include  $a_{\Delta e,i}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho}$ . This shrinks the model space to SVAR-BL and 10 alternative globally identified SVARs with impact matrices  $A_{M1}$ , ...,  $A_{M9}$ , and  $A_{RC}$ , that are listed in table 1. Since  $A_{M1}$  to  $A_{M4}$  have at least one impact coefficient above the diagonal, these SVARs are non-recursive. Restrictions on  $A_{M5}$  to  $A_{M9}$  have at least one zero below the diagonal and only zeros above the diagonal. No zeros are below the diagonal of  $A_{RC}$  giving SVAR-RC a recursive identification. The

SVARs globally identify international financial, cross-country nominal demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks.

# 4. THE TVP-SV-SVAR AND A MCMC SAMPLER

We introduce the TVP-SV-SVAR and outline the Metropolis in Gibbs MCMC sampler of Canova and Pérez Forero (2015) in this section.

#### 4.a A TVP-SV-SVAR for the Chinese silver standard

Canova and Pérez Forero (2015) create a TVP-SV-SVAR(k) by endowing  $\mathbf{A}$  and  $\mathbf{B}_1 \dots, \mathbf{B}_k$  of the fixed coefficient SVAR with TVPs and the scale volatilities of its diagonal matrix  $\mathbf{\Gamma}$  with SVs

$$\mathbf{A}_{t} \mathcal{Y}_{t} = \mathbf{A}_{t} \mathbf{c}_{t} + \mathbf{A}_{t} \sum_{\ell=1}^{k} \mathbf{B}_{\ell, t} \mathcal{Y}_{t-\ell} + \mathbf{\Gamma}_{t} \eta_{t}, \quad \eta_{t} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}_{n \times 1}, \mathbf{I}_{n}),$$
 (6)

where  $\mathbf{c}_t$  is a  $n \times 1$  vector of reduced-form TV intercepts.<sup>9</sup> The TVPs and SVs evolve as multivariate random walks with Gaussian innovations,  $a_{t+1} = a_t + \psi_{t+1}$ ,  $\psi_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Omega}_{\psi})$ ,  $\mathbb{B}_{t+1} = \mathbb{B}_t + \theta_{t+1}$ ,  $\theta_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Omega}_{\theta})$ , and  $\ln y_{t+1}^2 = \ln y_t^2 + \xi_{t+1}$ ,  $\xi_{t+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{\Omega}_{\xi})$ , where  $a_t$  is a vector of the off-diagonal TVPs of  $\mathbf{A}_t$ ,  $\mathbb{B}_t = \text{vec}([\mathbf{B}_{1,t} \dots \mathbf{B}_{k,t} \mathbf{c}_t])$ , and  $\text{diag}(\mathbf{\Gamma}_t) \equiv y_t = [y_{1,t} \dots y_{n,t}]'$ . Canova and Pérez Forero (CPF) assume a block diagonal covariance matrix

$$\mathbf{v} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{I}_{n} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{\Omega}_{9} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & \mathbf{\Omega}_{\psi} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & \mathbf{\Omega}_{\xi} \end{bmatrix}, \tag{7}$$

for the structural shocks,  $\eta_t$ , and random walk innovations  $\theta_t$ ,  $\psi_t$ , and  $\xi_t$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Implicit is the assumption that the elements of  $\mathcal{Y}_t$  are stationary. Appendix A1.6 reports Dickey-Fuller (DF) tests that reject a unit root in  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ ,  $\rho_t$ , and  $\Delta e_t$  on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples from 1912M04 to 1934M09. On the same samples, DF tests do not reject a unit root in  $p_t$ ,  $e_t$ , and the real exchange rate,  $q_t$ .

### 4.b A Metropolis in Gibbs MCMC sampler for TVP-SV-SVARs

Posterior distributions of the TVP-SV-SVAR(k)s of equation (6), the multivariate random walks of the TVPs and SVs, and covariance matrices of equation (7) are assembled using the Metropolis in Gibbs MCMC sampler of CPF (2015) and our priors. Their MCMC sampler solves the problem of sampling from the posterior of a TVP-SV-SVAR that has a nonlinear likelihood induced by a non-recursive identification.

Implementing the CPF-MCMC sampler is an algorithm organized around the correction to Primiceri (2005) devised by Del Negro and Primiceri (2015). The corrected sampler runs for  $\mathcal{D}$  steps. Its dth iteration begins with a Gibbs step to draw  $\mathbb{B}_{1:T}$  using the Carter and Kohn (1994) multi-move scheme constrained by the Koop and Potter (2011) rule to toss out  $\mathbb{B}_{1:T}$  if any  $\mathbb{B}_t$  is explosive. Next, draw  $a_{1:T}$  in a Metropolis step. This is followed with a Gibbs step that draws  $y_{1:T}$  employing the 10-point mixture normal distribution of Omori, Chib, Shephard, and Nakajima (2007). The last step of iteration d draws  $\Omega_{\vartheta}$ ,  $\Omega_{\psi}$ , and  $\Omega_{\xi}$ . Our priors are set to attain acceptance rates of 50 to 60% for non-explosive draws from the posterior distribution of  $\mathbb{B}_{1:T}$  and about 32% of the draws from the posterior distribution of  $a_{1:T}$ . Appendix A3 describes our priors and the CPF-Metropolis in Gibbs MCMC sampler.

We take  $\mathcal{D} = 500,000$  draws from posterior distributions of the TVP-SV-SVAR(k)s after  $0.5\mathcal{D}$  burn-in steps, given  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  (or  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$ ), our priors, and k=2. Posterior distributions are thinned to  $0.005\mathcal{D}$  by random sampling without replacement.

# 5. POSTERIOR MOMENTS OF THE TVP-SV-SVARS

This section assesses which of the 11 TVP-SV-SVAR(2)s are favored by the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples and reports the posterior distributions of these TVP-SV-SVAR(2)s.

### 5.a. Evaluating the TVP-SV-SVARs on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples

We evaluate the TVP-SV-SVAR(2)s using marginal data densities (MDDs) and the widely applicable information criterion (WAIC) of Watanabe (2010). The MDDs are informative about which TVP-SV-SVAR(2) is preferred by  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  or  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$ . Geweke (2005) is our guide to computing the MDDs. The WAIC compliments the MDD by finding the TVP-SV-SVAR(2) that has the smallest posterior 1-month ahead predictive loss, given  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  or  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$  and our priors. Gelman, et al (2014) advise calculating the WAIC as the negative of twice the posterior mean of the log predictive likelihood minus its variance. The variance of the posterior mean of the log predictive likelihood acts as a penalty term in the WAIC.

The bold entries in the ln MDD and WAIC columns of table 2 give decisive evidence that TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL offers the best fit and forecast (*i.e.*, largest ln MDD and smallest WAIC) on  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  and  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$ . The evidence is the samples prefer the identification of the impact matrix of equation (5) that restricts  $i_t$ ,  $\pi_t$ , and  $\rho_t$  to be causally prior to one another and to . Hence, the international financial shock affects these currency returns only through  $i_t$  at impact. The same holds for the impact responses of  $\Delta e_t$  to the  $\pi_t$ -cross-country nominal demand shock and  $\rho_t$ -risk premium shock pairs. Since  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  and  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$  prefer TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL, the rest of the paper focuses on its estimates to study the Chinese silver standard.

## 5.b. Time-varying impact coefficients

Figure 2 displays moments of  $a_{\Delta e, j, 1:T, CUK}$  ( $a_{\Delta e, j, 1:T, CUS}$ ) in the top (bottom) row taken from posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL,  $j=i, \pi$  and  $\rho$ . Solid lines are posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e, j, 1:T, CUK}$  and  $a_{\Delta e, j, 1:T, CUS}$  that are shaded by 68% Bayesian credible sets (*i.e.*, 16% and 84% quantiles). Burns and Mitchell (1946) monthly U.K. recessions are vertical (tan) bars in the top row of figure 2. Its bottom row has vertical (gray) bars that are NBER recessions.

The bottom row of figure 2 has posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUS}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUS}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho,1:T,CUS}$  that exhibit co-movement with every NBER recession from 1912M04 to 1934M09. However, only the posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUK}$  take a path that resembles the plots in the top row of panels of figure 2. Still, the top right panel shows only two troughs and one peak that occur during U.K. recessions dated by Burns and Mitchell (BM). These are at the start of the 1912M12-1914M09, end of the 1918M10-1919M04, and middle of the 1929M07-1932M08 (i.e., the U.K.'s Great Depression) recessions. Posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUK}$  and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho,1:T,CUK}$  peak during the U.K.'s Great Depression and 1920M03-1921M06 recession.

Mean reversion is evident in the posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUS}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUS}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho 1:T,CUS}$  in the bottom row of figure 2. Posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUS}$  fluctuate around one in the lower middle panel of the figure. The 68% Bayesian credible sets in the panel cover one in 190 of the 270 months of the sample suggesting relative purchasing power parity (PPP) is often not rejected for  $\Delta e_{USD/S,t}$  and  $\pi_{S,t}-\pi_{US,t}$  under the Chinese silver standard. The lower right panel of figure 2 shows posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,\rho 1:T,CUS}$  moving around zero indicating parity was restored to the Chinese silver standard as frequently as the six NBER recessions of the sample. There is also mean reversion in the posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUS}$  in the bottom left panel of figure 2, but  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUS} < 0$ . The implication is  $i_{S,t} > i_{US,t}$  led the Shanghai tael to appreciate suggesting it carried less risk than the USD during the sample.

Posterior distributions of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUK}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUK}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e,\rho,1:T,CUK}$  yield different inferences. First, the top left panel of figure 2 shows posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,i,1:T,CUK} > 0$ . This implies the Shanghai tael was riskier than the GBP when  $e_{GBP/S,t}$  depreciated in response to  $i_{S,t} > i_{UK,t}$ . Next, there is less evidence supporting relative PPP for  $\Delta e_{GBP/S,t}$  and  $\pi_{S,t} - \pi_{UK,t}$  because of the greater variability in the posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e,\pi,1:T,CUK}$  around one and the

width of the 68% Bayesian credible sets compared with the top middle panel. Lastly, the top right panel shows posterior medians of  $a_{\Delta e, \rho, 1:T, CUK}$  predict a one percent change in  $\rho_t$  generated a 40 to 60 basis point increase in  $\Delta e_{GBP/S,t}$ . These responses contrast with the mean reversion to parity observed in the bottom right panel of figure 2.

## 5.c. The Chinese silver standard: Volatility

Figure 3 depicts posterior medians of the SVs with solid lines that are covered by 68% Bayesian credible sets. These moments of the posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR-BL are conditional on  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  ( $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$ ) in the top (bottom) row of figure 3. From left to right, its columns contain posterior moments of  $\mathcal{Y}_{i,1:T,j}$ ,  $\mathcal{Y}_{\pi,1:T,j}$ ,  $\mathcal{Y}_{\rho,1:T,j}$ , and  $\mathcal{Y}_{\Delta e,1:T}$ , j = CUK, CUS.

Three of four posterior median SVs peak during BM dated U.K. recessions in the top row of figure 3. Three peak in the 1920M03–1921M06 recession  $(\gamma_{\pi,t,CUK},\gamma_{\rho,t,CUK},$  and  $\gamma_{\Delta e,t,CUK})$  and one  $(\gamma_{i,t,CUK})$  peaks four months (1921M10) after the trough of this recession. Posterior median SVs have secondary peaks between the 1920M03–1921M06 and 1924M11–1926M07 recessions  $(\gamma_{i,t,CUK})$  and during the 1927M03–1928M09  $(\gamma_{\rho,t,CUK})$  recession and the U.K.'s Great Depression  $(\gamma_{\pi,t,CUK})$  and  $\gamma_{\Delta e,t,CUK}$ .

The bottom row of figure 3 displays peaks in the posterior median SVs during NBER recessions. Two peak in the 1920M01–1921M07 recession  $(\gamma_{i,t,CUS})$  and  $\gamma_{m,t,CUS}$ . Another peak coincides with the 1918M08–1919M03 recession  $(\gamma_{\rho,t,CUS})$  and one in the Great Depression  $(\gamma_{\Delta e,t,CUS})$ . There are secondary peaks in the First World War  $(\gamma_{m,t,CUS})$  and  $\gamma_{\Delta e,t,CUS}$  and the 1923M05–1924M07  $(\gamma_{i,t,CUS})$  and 1926M10–1927M11  $(\gamma_{\rho,t,CUS})$  recessions.

Figure 3 also shows posterior medians of the SVs are falling at the end of the sample except for  $y_{\rho,1:T,CUK}$  and  $y_{\rho,1:T,CUS}$ . These medians take a W-shaped path from a peak in 1920M06 and 1918M09 to 1934M09, but substantial disparities exist in the height of these peak SVs compared

with observations from 1934M06 to 1934M09. Posterior medians during these months are 50 to 60% less than the peaks of  $\gamma_{\rho,1:T,CUK}$  at 1920M06 and  $\gamma_{\rho,1:T,CUS}$  at 1918M09.

# 6. Time-varying UIP, Predictability, and (In)Stability

This section employs monthly tests of UIP, predictability and instability statistics, and IRFs to study the efficiency and (in)stability of the Chinese silver standard.

## 6.a The Chinese silver standard; Time-varying tests of UIP

Rejections of UIP on the Chinese silver standard only appear in the China-U.K. sample from spring 1918 into the 1920s. The evidence is obtained by adapting methods of Hodrick (1992) to test the Chinese silver standard for violations of UIP. His formulas and posterior distribution of a TVP-SV-SVAR are engaged to compute the TV-slope coefficient of the Fama regression,  $\Delta e_{t+1} = \delta_{0,t} + \delta_{1,t} \left(i_{S,t} - i_{j,t}\right) + \zeta_{\Delta e,t+1}$ . We also report estimates of the TV-slope coefficient of the real exchange rate cousin of the Fama regression,  $\Delta q_{t+1} = \varrho_{0,t} + \varrho_{1,t} \left(r_{j,t} - r_{S,t}\right) + \zeta_{\Delta q,t+1}$ , that is constructed by substituting  $\rho_{t+1}$  for the dependent variable of the Fama regression to turn its slope coefficient into  $\delta_{1,t}-1$  and using  $\Delta e_{t+1} - \pi_{t+1} = r_t + \rho_{t+1} - \left(\pi_{t+1} - \mathbf{E}_t \pi_{t+1}\right)$ , where the ex ante real rate spread  $r_t = i_t - \mathbf{E}_t \pi_{t+1}$ ,  $r_t = r_{S,t} - r_{j,t}$ , and j = UK, US. Our interest is in the null hypotheses of UIP,  $\delta_{1,t} = 1$  and  $\varrho_{1,t} = 1$ , at  $t = 1, \ldots, T$ .

Engel (2016) stresses the signs of  $\operatorname{cov} \left( \mathbf{E}_t \rho_{t+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right)$  and  $\operatorname{cov} \left( \mathbf{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t+j+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right)$  are useful for studying UIP. Rejection rests on either covariance not equaling zero, but the  $\operatorname{cov} \left( \mathbf{E}_t \rho_{t+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right) > 0$  and  $\operatorname{cov} \left( \mathbf{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t+j+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right) < 0$  summarize Engel's exchange rate-risk premium paradox. The first inequality signals there is excess sensitivity of  $\Delta e_{t+1}$  to a change in  $i_t$ . This points to greater risk on the Shanghai tael compared with the GBP or USD. The latter inequality is about excess volatility in  $e_t$  that implies a stronger Shang-

hai *tael* carried less risk. Appendix A4 shows the TV-slope coefficient,  $\phi_{H,t}$ , of the long-horizon regression  $\rho_{t+1} = \phi_{0,t} + \phi_{H,t} \sum_{h=0}^{H-1} \left( r_{j,t-h} - r_{S,t-h} \right) + \zeta_{\rho,t+1}$  approximates the sign of  $\operatorname{cov}_t \left( \operatorname{E}_t \sum_{j=0}^{\infty} \rho_{t+j+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right)$  and replicates it as  $H \to \infty$ . The sign of  $\operatorname{cov}_t \left( \operatorname{E}_t \rho_{t+1}, \, r_{j,t} - r_{S,t} \right)$  is recovered from  $\phi_{H,t}$  when H = 1. We use formulas in Hodrick (1992), which are also described in Appendix A4, to compute  $\phi_{h,t}$ ,  $h = 1, \ldots, H$ , given a TVP-SV-SVAR.

Figure 4 collects posterior moments of  $\delta_{1:T,j}$ ,  $\varrho_{1:T,j}$ ,  $\varphi_{1,1:T,j}$ , and  $\varphi_{3,1:T,j}$  for j=CUK in the top and j=CUS in the bottom row in panels from left to right. The posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL conditional on  $\mathcal{Y}_{1:T,CUK}\left(\mathcal{Y}_{1:T,CUS}\right)$  and our priors yield medians (solid lines) shaded by 68% Bayesian credible sets in the top (lower) row of figure 4. Since posterior medians of  $\varphi_{H,1:T}\approx 0$  at H>3, we report long-horizon regressions at H=3.

Rejections of UIP appear in the upper middle two panels of figure 4, but its lower middle panels show this is not true for plots of  $\varrho_{1:T,CUS}$  and  $\varphi_{3,1:T,CUS}$ . The 68% Bayesian credible sets of  $\varrho_{1918\text{M}12:1920\text{M}06,CUK}$  exclude one, which rejects UIP. These dates run from the month after the Armistice that ended the First World War to two months after the Bank of England rate hit 7%, which Howson (1974) argues ended the U.K.'s post-war boom. More evidence against UIP are 68% Bayesian credible sets of  $\varphi_{1,1918\text{M}07:1927\text{M}11,CUK}$  that are bounded above zero. At the 1-month horizon, investors anticipated excess returns on deposits in GBP relative to Shanghai tael from two months after a new Governor began at the Bank of England to the middle of the BM dated recession of 1927M03-1928M09.

The remaining four panels of figure 4 lack evidence to reject UIP. The 68% Bayesian credible sets of  $\delta_{1:T,CUK}$  and  $\delta_{1:T,CUK}$  and  $\phi_{3,1:T,CUK}$  and  $\phi_{3,1:T,CUS}$  cover one (zero) in the first (last) column of figure 4. However, the exchange rate-risk premium paradox of Engel (2016) is satisfied by the posterior medians of  $\phi_{1,1:T,CUK} > 0$  and  $\phi_{3,1917M03:T,CUK} < 0$  in the last two panels

of the top row of figure 4. In the row below, these panels show the signs are reversed for the posterior medians of  $\phi_{1,1:T,CUS}$  and  $\phi_{3,1:T,CUS}$ .

6.b. The Chinese Silver Standard: Predictability of deviations from trend of  $p_t$  and  $e_t$  Cogley, Primiceri, and Sargent (2010) propose a h-step ahead TV-predictability statistic,  $\Re^2_{z,h,t}$ , for any  $z_t \sim I(1)$  that is one minus the ratio of its conditional to its unconditional variance. As they do, we invoke the anticipated utility model (AUM) of Kreps (1998) to address the problem of forecasting with TVPs and SVs. This makes  $\Re^2_{z,h,t}$  an approximation. Nevertheless,  $\Re^2_{z,h,t}$  measures the h-step ahead predictability of deviations from the trend of  $z_t$ . If the deviations are unpredictable h-steps ahead at date t,  $\Re^2_{z,h,t} = 0$ . Also,  $\lim_{h \to \infty} \Re^2_{z,h,t} = 0$ . Predictability places  $\Re^2_{z,h,t} \in (0,1)$ . When  $\Re^2_{z,h,t}$  is rising, it is evidence of decreasing stability in  $z_t$  at the h-step ahead horizon. Appendix A5 reviews our approach to computing  $\Re^2_{z,h,t}$ .

Figure 5 plots posterior medians (solid lines) and 68% Bayesian credible sets of  $\Re^2_{p,1,1:T}$ ,  $\Re^2_{p,6,1:T}$ ,  $\Re^2_{e,1,1:T}$  and  $\Re^2_{e,6,1:T}$  from 1912M04 to 1934M09 in columns from left to right. The top (bottom) row displays moments taken from the posterior distribution of TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL conditional on  $y_{1:T,CUK}$  ( $y_{1:T,CUS}$ ) and our priors.

Predictability of deviations from trend is greatest in the left column of figure 5. Its top and bottom panels display posterior medians of  $\mathcal{R}^2_{p,1,1:T} > \mathcal{R}^2_{p,6,1:T}$ ,  $\mathcal{R}^2_{e,1,1:T}$ , and  $\mathcal{R}^2_{e,6,1:T}$ . Comparing posterior medians of  $\mathcal{R}^2_{p,1,t}$  shows the top left panel offers more (less) predictability from 1912м04 to 1920м07 (1920м08 to 1934м09). The top and bottom left panels also show posterior medians of  $\mathcal{R}^2_{p,1,t}$  rising from 1932м09 and 1927м01 to 1934м09. Although the U.K.'s Great Depression recession ended a month after 1932м09 and the Nanjing government obtained control of the Shanghai Customs Office in 1927м01, these dates are two to more than seven years before the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934м06.

The last three columns of figure 5 display posterior moments of  $\Re^2_{p,6,1:T}$ ,  $\Re^2_{e,1,1:T}$ , and  $\Re^2_{e,6,1:T}$ . The 68% Bayesian credible sets of  $\Re^2_{p,6,t}$  are well above zero by no later than the end of the First World War in the second column of panels. The third column shows substantial predictability of deviations from trend at the 1-month horizon for  $e_{GBP/S,t}$  and  $e_{USD/S,t}$  from 1912M04 to 1934M09. However, the right most panels of figure 5 display 68% Bayesian credible sets with lower quantiles ranging from zero to 0.008 that indicate predictability of deviations from trend for  $e_{GBP/S,1:T}$  and  $e_{USD/S,1:T}$  vanishes by the 6-month horizon.

# 6.c. The Chinese Silver Standard: (In)Stability of $p_t$ and $e_t$

We gauge instability in the Chinese silver standard with a statistic developed by Cogley and Sargent (2015). They calculate instability in the I(1) variable  $z_t$  as the square root of the sum of two components. The first is the forward-looking uncertainty around  $\mathbf{E}_t \Delta z_{t+h}$ , which is the conditional variance of this forecast,  $\mathcal{V}_t \left( z_{t+h} - \mathbf{E}_t z_{t+h} \right)$ . Add to this the variance of the h-step ahead expected accumulated growth of  $z_t$ ,  $\mathbf{E}_t z_{t+h} - z_t$ . The result is the Cogley and Sargent measure of instability  $\sigma_{z,h,t} \approx \sqrt{\mathcal{V}_t \left( z_{t+h} - \mathbf{E}_t z_{t+h} \right) + \left( \mathbf{E}_t z_{t+h} - z_t \right)^2}$ ; see their equation (8). We appeal to the AUM, as in Cogley and Sargent (2015), to compute  $\sigma_{z,h,t}$  on the posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL. Appendix A7 has details about adapting Cogley and Sargent (2015) to calculate  $\sigma_{z,h,t}$  on a TVP-SV-SVAR.

Figure 6 displays posterior distributions of  $\sigma_{p,h,1:T}$  and  $\sigma_{e,h,1:T}$  at 1- and 12-month horizons in columns from left to right on the 1912M04–1934M09 sample. The 68% Bayesian credible sets cover solid lines that are posterior medians. Distributions in the top (bottom) row depend on TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL,  $\mathcal{Y}_{CUK,1:T}$  ( $\mathcal{Y}_{CUS,1:T}$ ) and our priors.

The Chinese silver standard saw instability peak during the recession of the early 1920s and Great Depression as shown in the top and bottom rows of figure 6. In the top row, posterior

medians of  $\sigma_{p,1,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{p,12,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{e,1,t}$ , and  $\sigma_{e,12,t}$  peak at 1921M02, 1920M11, 1920M12, and 1920M12, respectively. The same row has secondary peaks in the posterior medians of these instability statistics in 1931M10 remembering the U.K. left the gold standard and Japan invaded Manchuria the previous month. In contrast, the bottom row of figure 6 shows posterior medians of  $\sigma_{p,1,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{p,12,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{e,1,t}$ , and  $\sigma_{e,12,t}$  peaking during the NBER recession of 1920M01–1921M07 and the Great Depression at 1920M10, 1931M05, 1931M05, and 1931M06. The secondary peaks occur at 1931M05, 1920M10, 1920M04, and 1920M04 in the same row of the figure.

Posterior distributions of  $\sigma_{p,1,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{p,12,t}$ ,  $\sigma_{e,1,t}$ , and  $\sigma_{e,12,t}$  shift down after the Great Depression both rows of figure 6. The upshot is that, although 68% Bayesian credible sets are wider around posterior medians at the 12-month horizon in 1933 and 1934, figure 6 shows the posterior medians are lower after the Great Depression.

## 6.d. The Chinese Silver Standard: TV-IRFs in 1934

Figures 7 and 8 report posterior median IRFs at 1934 $\pm$ 01, 1934 $\pm$ 06, and 1934 $\pm$ 09 created using the TVP-SV-SVAR(2)-BL conditional on  $y_{1:T,CUK}$  and  $y_{1:T,CUS}$  and our priors. The dates are six months before the U.S. Silver Purchase Act became law, its month of passage, and end of the sample. The top row depicts IRFs of  $i_t$  with respect to international financial, cross-country nominal demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks from impact to the 12-month horizon. The IRFs of  $p_t$ ,  $p_t$ , and  $p_t$  on the same shocks appear in the next three rows in figures 7 and 8. We accumulate IRFs of  $p_t$  and  $p_t$  to compute IRFs of  $p_t$  and  $p_t$ .

The structural shocks produce median posterior IRFs of  $i_t$  and  $\rho_t$  at 1934 $\pm$ 01, 1934 $\pm$ 06, and 1934 $\pm$ 09 in figures 7 and 8 that are mean reverting. The top row of figures 7 and 8 have posterior median IRFs of  $i_t$  that return to steady state by five months after an international financial, a cross-country nominal demand, a risk premium, or a trend exchange rate shock.

The four shocks also produce posterior median IRFs of  $\rho_t$  in figures 7 and 8 that revert to steady state by the 5-month horizon. This shows equilibrium was restored to the Chinese silver standard in less than half a year after a shock to parity in 1934M06.

The four shocks produce posterior median IRFs of  $p_t$  and  $e_t$  at 1934M01, 1934M06, and 1934M09 in figures 7 and 8 that often predict  $p_{S,t}$  increasing faster than  $p_{UK,t}$  or  $p_{US,t}$  and depreciation of  $e_{GBP/S,T}$  and  $e_{USD/S,T}$ . The depreciation predicted for the Shanghai *tael* is found in the positive hump-shaped posterior median IRFs to the cross-country nominal demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks in the bottom row of the figures. The international financial shock also produces hump-shaped posterior median IRFs of  $e_t$  in the bottom left panels of figures 7 and 8. However, the latter panel shows these IRFs are always negative, which shows the international financial shock generated an appreciation of  $e_{USD/S,T}$ .

Lastly, we garner evidence about the stability of the Chinese silver standard from 1934м01 to 1934м09 by comparing posterior median IRFs in figure 7 and figure 8. Going panel by panel finds posterior median IRFs at 1934м01, 1934м06, and 1934м09 are often identical in height, shape, and persistence. Hence, figures 7 and 8 give additional evidence the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934м06 had little impact on the Chinese silver standard before 1934м10.

## 7. CONCLUSION

This paper studies whether the Chinese silver standard failed because its operating mechanism was fragile or the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934M06 drained China of silver. The hypotheses are examined using the framework of the exchange rate-risk premium model of Engel (2016). Starting from his model, we build a baseline and 10 alternative structural VARs (SVARs). The SVARs include time varying parameters (TVPs) and stochastic volatility (SV). Bayesian meth-

ods are used to estimate the TVP-SV-SVARs on newly available China-U.K. and China-U.S. samples from 1912m04 to 1934m09. The estimates let us to test for uncovered interest parity (UIP) under the Chinese silver standard and its predictability and instability month by month.

Our results show the Chinese silver standard was resilient as it weathered the turmoil China, the U.K., and U.S. faced from 1912 to 1934. Rejections of UIP are only at the 1-month horizon for the *GBP*-Shanghai *tael* exchange rate from the end of the First World War into the 1920s. Predictability in deviations from the trends of the China-U.K. and China-U.S. WPI differentials begin to rise two years or more before the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934M06. Episodes of instability in the WPI differentials and *GBP*- and *USD*-Shanghai *tael* exchange rates occur during the recession of the early 1920s and Great Depression. Similarly, impulse response functions change little in the 1930s. These results are testimony the U.S. Silver Purchase Act of 1934M06 had little impact on the Chinese silver standard. We conclude the Chinese silver standard did not fail because of its own fragility or the actions of the U.S. Congress.

This leaves actions the Nanjing government took starting in 1934M10 to explain the demise of the Chinese silver standard. Brandt and Sargent (1989) argue the Chinese silver standard was disrupted by the Nanjing government pursuing goals that caused private agents to revise their expectations about the monetary regime in China. After 1934M10, changes in these expectations led to a growing exodus of silver from China that, according to Brandt and Sargent, contributed to the Nanjing government replacing the Chinese silver standard with the *fabi* in 1935M11. It is beyond the scope of this paper to assess the account Brandt and Sargent offer to explain the end of the Chinese silver standard. Nonetheless, along with stimulating research on the Chinese silver standard, we hope this paper spurs work on the consequences of policy making that leads to unforeseen revisions to private sector expectations.

## References

- Beveridge, S., C.R. Nelson (1981). A new approach to decomposition of economic time series into permanent and transitory components with particular attention to measurement of the business cycle. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 7, 151–174.
- Brandt, L., D. Ma, T.G. Rawski (2014). From divergence to convergence: Reevaluating the history behind China's economic boom. *Journal of Economic Literature* 52, 45–123.
- Brandt, L., T.J. Sargent (1989). Interpreting new evidence about China and U.S. silver purchases. *Journal of Monetary Economics* 23, 31–51.
- Bratter, H.M. (1933). The monetary use of silver in 1933. Trade Promotion Series, No. 149, Department of Commerce. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Burdekin, R.C.K. (2008). US pressure on China: Silver flows, deflation, and the 1934 Shanghai credit crunch. *China Economic Review* 19, 170–182.
- Burns, A.F., W.C. Mitchell (1946). MEASURING BUSINESS CYCLE. New York: NY: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Canova, F., F.J. Pérez Forero (2015). Estimating overidentified, non-recursive, time varying coefficient structural VARs. *Quantitative Economics* 6, 359–384.
- Carter, C.K., R. Kohn (1994). On Gibbs sampling for state space models. *Biometrika* 81, 541–553.
- Chang, P-H.K. (1988). Commodity price shocks and international finance. Unpublished dissertation, Department of Economics, MIT, Cambridge, MA.
- Chen, B., D. Li, Y. Xie (2022). Silver, fiduciary money, and the Chinese economy, 1890–1935. *Review of International Economics* 30, 939–970.
- Cogley, T., G.E. Primiceri, T.J. Sargent (2010). Inflation-gap persistence in the US. *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 2, 43–69.
- Cogley, T., T.J. Sargent (2015). Measuring price-level uncertainty and instability in the United States, 1850–2012. *Review of Economics & Statistics* 97, 827–838.
- Dean, A. (2020). CHINA AND THE END OF GLOBAL SILVER, 1873–1937. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Del Negro, M., G.E. Primiceri (2015). Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy: A corrigendum. *Review of Economic Studies* 82, 1342–1345.
- Engel, C. (2016). Exchange rates, interest rates, and the risk premium. *American Economic Review* 106, 436–474.
- Friedman, M. (1992). Franklin D. Roosevelt, silver and China. *Journal of Political Economy* 100, 62–83.
- Friedman, M., A.J. Schwartz (1963). A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1960. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

- Gelman, A., J.B. Carlin, H.S. Stern, D.B. Dunsun, A. Vehtari, D.B. Rubin (2014). BAYESIAN DATA ANALYSIS, 3RD EDITION. New York, NY: CRC Press, Taylor & Francis Group.
- Geweke, J. (2005). CONTEMPORARY BAYESIAN ECONOMETRICS AND STATISTICS. New York, NY: J. Wiley & Sons.
- Ho, C-Y., D. Li (2014). A mirror of history: China's bond market, 1921-42. *Economic History Review* 67, 409-434.
- Ho, T-K. (2014). Dilemma of the silver standard economies: The case of China. *Southern Economic Journal* 81, 519–534.
- Ho, T-K., C-C. Lai (2013). Silver fetters? The rise and fall of the Chinese price level 1928–34. *Explorations in Economic History* 50, 446–462.
- Ho, T-K., C-C. Lai (2016). A silver lifeboat, not silver fetters: Why and how the silver standard insulated China from the Great Depression. *Journal of Applied Econometrics* 32, 403–419.
- Ho, T-K., C-C. Lai, J.J-S. Gau (2013). Equilibrium and adjustment of exchange rates in the Chinese silver standard economy, 1928–1935. *Cliometrica* 7, 87–98.
- Hodrick, R.J. (1992). Dividend yields and expected stock returns: Alternative procedures for inference and measurement. *Review of Financial Studies* 5, 357–386.
- Howson, S. (1974). The origins of dear money, 1919-20. Economic History Review, 27, 88-107.
- Jacks, D.S., S. Yan, L. Zhao. (2017). Silver points, silver flows, and the measure of Chinese financial integration. *Journal of International Economics* 108, 377–386.
- Kong, M. (1988). NANKAI JINGJI ZHISHU ZILIAO HUIBIAN (NANKAI COLLECTION: ECONOMIC INDEX MATERIALS). Beijing, China: Social Sciences Press.
- Koop, G., S. Potter (2011). Time varying VARs with inequality restrictions. *Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control* 35, 1126–1138.
- Kreps, D. (1998). Anticipated utility and dynamic choice. In Frontiers of Research in Eco-NOMIC THEORY: THE NANCY L. SCHWARTZ MEMORIAL LECTURES, 1983–1997. Jacobs, D.P., E. Kalai, M.I. Kamien, N.L. Schwartz (eds.), Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Lai, C-C., J.J-S. Gau (2003). The Chinese silver standard economy and the 1929 Great Depression. *Australian Economic History Review* 43, 155–168.
- Leavens, D.H. (1939). SILVER MONEY. Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph no. 4. Bloomington, IN: Principia Press, Inc.
- Ma, D. (2019). Financial revolution in Republican China during 1900–37: A survey and a new interpretation. *Australian Economic History Review* 59, 242–262.
- Ma, D., L. Zhao (2020). A silver transformation: Chinese monetary integration in times of political disintegration, 1898–1933. *Economic History Review*, 73, 513–539.

- Nason, J.M., J.H. Rogers. (2008). Exchange rates and fundamentals: A generalization. Working paper 2008–16, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Omori, Y., S. Chib, N. Shephard, J. Nakajima (2007). Stochastic volatility with leverage: Fast and efficient likelihood inference. *Journal of Econometrics* 140, 425–449.
- Palma, N., L. Zhao (2021). The efficiency of the Chinese silver standard, 1920–1933. *Journal of Economic History* 81, 872–908.
- Primiceri, G.E. (2005). Time varying structural vector autoregressions and monetary policy. *Review of Economic Studies* 72, 821–852.
- Rawski, T. (1993). Milton Friedman, silver and China. Journal of Political Economy 101, 755–758.
- Rubio-Ramírez, J.F., D.F. Waggoner, T. Zha (2010). Structural vector autoregressions: Theory of identification and algorithms for inference. *Review of Economic Studies* 77, 665–696.
- Shanghai Research Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of Sciences and Research Institute of Economics, Shanghai Social Sciences Academy (1958). *Shanghai chieh-fang chien-hou we-chia tzu-liao hui-pien* (A COLLECTION OF DATA ON PRICES IN SHANGHAI BEFORE AND AFTER LIBERATION), 1921–1957. Shanghai, China: Shanghai People's Publishing House.
- Shiroyama, T. (2008). CHINA DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION: MARKET, STATE, AND THE WORLD ECONOMY, 1929–1937. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
- Silber, W.L. (2019). THE STORY OF SILVER: HOW THE WHITE METAL SHAPED AMERICA AND THE MODERN WORLD. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Young, J.P. (1931). The Shanghai tael. American Economic Review 21, 682-684.
- Watanabe, S. (2010). Asymptotic equivalence of Bayes cross validation and widely applicable information criterion in singular learning theory. *Journal of Machine Learning Research* 11, 3571–3594.
- Wu, D. (1935). Yige xinde waihui zhishu (A new exchange rate index). *Review of Political Economy* 21, 463–509.
- Zhao, L., Y. Zhao (2018). Alfred Marshall, Silver, and China. *Australian Economic History Review* 58, 153–175.
- Zhongguo ren min yin hang Shanghai Shi fen hang (People's Bank of China, Shanghai Branch) (1960). Shanghai qianzhuang shiliao (SHANGHAI BANKING HISTORICAL RECORDS). Shanghai People's Press: Shanghai, China.

## TABLE 1. IMPACT MATRICES OF THE ALTERNATIVE GLOBALLY IDENTIFIED SVARS

$$\begin{split} \mathbf{A}_{\text{M1}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & -a_{\pi,\Delta e} \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & -a_{\rho,\Delta e} \\ -a_{\Delta e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathbf{A}_{\text{M2}} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -a_{\pi,\rho} & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & -a_{\rho,\Delta e} \\ -a_{\Delta e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{M3}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & -a_{\pi,\Delta e} \\ 0 & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\Delta e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathbf{A}_{\text{M4}} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -a_{\pi,\rho} & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & -a_{\pi,\rho} & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{M5}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\Delta e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \quad \mathbf{A}_{\text{M6}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{M8}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\alpha e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{M9}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\pi,i} & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\alpha e,i} & -a_{\Delta e,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \\ \mathbf{A}_{\text{RC}} &= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & 1 & 0 \\ -a_{\rho,i} & -a_{\rho,\pi} & -a_{\Delta e,\rho} & 1 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$$


Notes: Global identification is verified using criteria developed by Rubio-Ramírez, Waggoner, and Zha (2010). The (d, j) element of  $\mathbf{A}_{\ell}$  is the impact coefficient  $a_{dj}$ , where  $d \neq j$  and  $\ell = M1, \ldots, M9$ , and RC, where Mx denotes SVAR  $\mathbf{x} = 1, \ldots, 9$ , and RC is the recursive SVAR. Equation (5) has the impact matrix of our baseline SVAR, SVAR-BL.

TABLE 2. MDDs AND WAICS OF THE BASELINE AND ALTERNATIVE GLOBALLY IDENTIFIED SVARS ON THE CHINA-U.K. AND CHINA-U.S. SAMPLES, 1912M04-1934M09

SVAR	${\mathcal Y}_{CUK,1:T}$		$y_{\scriptscriptstyle CUS,1:T}$	
	ln MDD	WAIC	ln MDD	WAIC
BL	-2049.45	5838.59	-2115.40	5853.55
M1	-2564.19	6150.10	-2826.01	6067.70
M2	-2508.43	6088.25	-2716.09	6180.55
М3	-2151.04	5985.73	-2331.61	5941.21
M4	-2247.96	5908.49	-2426.98	5923.75
M5	-2257.41	5847.40	-2244.37	5889.24
M6	-2185.39	5905.78	-2170.32	5883.31
M7	-2173.85	5840.45	-2363.15	5940.85
М8	-2167.46	5867.85	-2221.30	5868.09
М9	-2249.30	5858.85	-2224.19	5876.26
RC	-2421.83	5967.97	-2542.05	6007.94


Notes: Log marginal data densities (MDDs) appear in the column headed lnMDD. The MDDs are calculated using the harmonic mean estimator of Geweke (2005), 2,500 draws from the posterior of the TVP-SV-SVAR(2)s, the China-U.K. and China-U.S samples,  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  and  $y_{CUS,1:T}$ , and our priors. The support  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  or  $y_{CUS,1:T}$  give to a TVP-SV-VAR(2) is summarized by its MDD. The column headed WAIC reports the widely applicable information criterion of Watanabe (2010), which is also known as the Watanabe-Akaike-IC. The WAIC is an estimate of the 1-month ahead predictive loss of a TVP-SV-SVAR(2). Gelman et al (2014) advise computing the predictive loss as twice the difference between a penalty term and the mean of the log predictive likelihoods. Estimates of the likelihood are obtained from the predictive steps of the Kalman filter and posterior of a TVP-SV-SVAR(2). The penalty term of the WAIC measures the effective dimension of the parameter vector. It is the sum of the posterior variances of the likelihood of a TVP-SV-SVAR(2). Values in bold are the largest ln MDD and smallest WAIC on  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  or  $y_{CUS,1:T}$ .

Figure 1: China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912m04 to 1934m09




Notes: The top left panel plots the interest spreads,  $i_t = i_{S,t} - i_{\ell,t}$ ,  $\ell = UK$ , US. Plots of the inflation differentials,  $\pi_t = \pi_{S,t} - \pi_{\ell,t}$ , appear in the top right panel. Risk premiums as deviations from parity,  $\rho_{\ell,t}$ , are displayed in the bottom left panel. The bottom right panel contains month over month nominal currency returns,  $\Delta e_{GBP/S,t}$  and  $\Delta e_{USD/S,t}$ . The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 2: Posterior Moments of the  $a_{1:T}$ s on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912m04 to 1934m09




Notes: The top (bottom) row of panels contain solid lines that are the medians of the posterior distributions of  $a_{\Delta e, i, 1:T, CUK}$ ,  $a_{\Delta e, \pi, 1:T, CUK}$ , and  $a_{\Delta e, \rho, 1:T, CUK}$  and  $a_{\Delta e, \rho, 1:T, CUK}$  conditional on TVP-SV-SVAR-BL,  $y_{CUK, 1:T}$  ( $y_{CUS, 1:T}$ ) and our priors. The shadings around the medians of the posterior are 68% Bayesian credible sets (*i.e.*, 16th and 84th quantiles). The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars in the upper (lower) row are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 3: Posterior Moments of  $\gamma_{1:T}$  on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912m04 to 1934m09




Notes: The top (bottom) row displays panels with solid lines plotting medians of posterior distributions of  $y_{j,1:T,CUK}$  ( $y_{j,1:T,CUS}$ ) conditional on TVP-SV-SVAR-BL,  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  ( $y_{CUS,1:T}$ ) and our priors,  $j=i,\pi,\rho$ , and  $\Delta e$ . The shadings around the posterior medians are 68% Bayesian credible sets. The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars in the upper (lower) row are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 4: Slope Coefficients of the Fama and Engel UIP Regressions on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912m04 to 1934m09




Notes: Moving from left to right, the figure presents posterior distributions of the slope coefficients  $\delta_{1,t}$ ,  $\varrho_{1,t}$ , and  $\phi_{H,t}$  from regressions of  $\Delta e_{t+1}$  on an intercept and  $i_{j,t}-i_{S,t}$ ,  $\Delta q_{t+1}$  on an intercept and  $r_{j,t}-r_{S,t}$ , and  $\varrho_{t+1}$  on an intercept and  $\sum_{h=0}^{H-1} \left(r_{j,t-h}-r_{S,t-h}\right)$ , where j=UK, US and H=1, S=0. The top (bottom) row has slope coefficients computed using the posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR-BL conditional on  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  ( $y_{CUS,1:T}$ ), and our priors. The solid lines are posterior medians of  $\delta_{1,t}$ ,  $\varrho_{1,t}$ ,  $\phi_{1,t}$ , and  $\phi_{3,t}$ . The shadings around the posterior medians are 68% Bayesian credible sets. The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars in the upper (lower) row are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 5: Posterior Moments of  $\Re^2_{p,h,1:T}$  and  $\Re^2_{e,h,1:T}$  on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912 M 04 to 1934 M 09




Notes: The top (bottom) row plot the medians of the posterior distributions of  $\Re^2_{z,1,1:T}$  and the  $\Re^2_{z,6,1:T}$  produced by TVP-SV-SVAR-BL,  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  ( $y_{CUS,1:T}$ ), and our priors, where z=p or e. The shadings around the posterior medians are 68% Bayesian credible sets. The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars in the upper (lower) row are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 6: Posterior Moments of  $\sigma_{p,h,1:T}$  and  $\sigma_{e,h,1:T}$  on the China-U.K. and China-U.S. Samples, 1912 $\pm$ 04 to 1934 $\pm$ 09




Notes: The top (bottom) row plot the medians of the posterior distributions of  $\sigma_{z,h,1:T} = \sqrt{V_t (z_{t+h} - E_t z_{t+h}) + (E_t z_{t+h} - z_t)^2}$  produced by TVP-SV-SVAR-BL,  $y_{CUK,1:T} (y_{CUS,1:T})$ , and our priors, where z = p or e, and h = 1 and 12. The shadings around the posterior medians are 68% Bayesian credible sets. The tan (silver) shaded vertical bars in the upper (lower) row are Burns-Mitchell (NBER) recession dates for the U.K. (U.S.).

Figure 7: Impulse Response Functions in 1934 on the China-U.K. Sample



Notes: The top, second, third, and bottom rows display IRFs of  $i_t$ ,  $p_t$ ,  $p_t$ , and  $e_t$  at 1934 $\pm$ 01 (dashed line), 1934 $\pm$ 06 (diamond line), and 1934 $\pm$ 09 (dotted line) computed using the posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR-BL on  $y_{CUK,1:T}$  and our priors. From right to left, the columns plot IRFs with respect to the international financial, nominal cross-country demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks. The IRFs run from impact to a 12-month horizon, h = 0, 1, ..., 12.

Figure 8: Impulse Response Functions in 1934 on the China-U.S. Sample



Notes: The top, second, third, and bottom rows display IRFs of  $i_t$ ,  $p_t$ ,  $p_t$ , and  $e_t$  at 1934 $\pm$ 01 (dashed line), 1934 $\pm$ 06 (diamond line), and 1934 $\pm$ 09 (dotted line) computed using the posterior distributions of TVP-SV-SVAR-BL on  $y_{CUS,1:T}$  and our priors. From right to left, the columns plot IRFs with respect to the international financial, nominal cross-country demand, risk premium, and trend exchange rate shocks. The IRFs run from impact to a 12-month horizon, h = 0, 1, ..., 12.